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1 Introduction
This paper surveys recent progress on the construction of provably secure
one-way hash functions, under gradually weakened assumptions.
One-way hash functions have many cryptographic applications. In digi-
tal signatures, they are used to compress long input strings prior to actual
signing procedures. This usually greatly improves the overall e±ciency of
a signature scheme. They are also used to detect un-authorized modi¯ca-
tions to important messages by such as malicious users or computer viruses.
Another novel application of (provably secure) one-way hash functions, due
to Naor and Yung [NY89], is that they can be used to construct (provably
secure) digital signature schemes.
There are roughly two kinds of one-way hash functions: universal one-
way hash functions (UOHs) and collision intractable hash functions (CIHs).
The main property of the former is that given an initial-string x, it is com-
putationally di±cult to ¯nd a di®erent string y that collides with x. And
the main property of the latter is that it is computationally di±cult to ¯nd
a pair x 6= y of strings such that x collides with y. Note that a CIH is also a
UOH.
Two fundamental problems concerned with one-way hash functions are:
1. Constructing UOHs and
2. Constructing CIHs
1both under the assumption of the existence of one-way functions.
Note that the assumption can not be weakened further, since a UOH or a
CIH itself is a one-way function. The ¯rst problem has recently been solved
by Rompel, while the second problem remains an interesting challenge.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey
progress recently obtained on the construction of one-way hash functions
(UOHs and CIHs) under gradually weakened assumptions. In Section 3, we
pose the open problem on the construction of CIHs. In References we include
papers that are closely related to the subject of provably secure one-way
hash functions. Finally in Appendix, we give formal de¯nitions for one-way
functions, universal hash functions, UOHs and CIHs etc.
2 History
2.1 Reference [Dam87]
This is the ¯rst paper that formally treats one-way hash functions. In par-
ticular, it gives a formal de¯nition for CIH, one of the aforementioned two
kinds of one-way functions. It also presents a method for constructing CIHs
from claw free pairs of permutations, whose existence implies that of one-way
permutations and hence that of one-way functions.
2.2 Reference [Dam89]
It presents two ways (a serial one and a parallel one) of compressing arbi-
trarily long input strings into ¯xed length output strings, given a CIH that
compresses input strings into output ones that are only one bit shorter than
the input ones.
2.3 Reference [NY89]
This is the ¯rst paper that introduces UOHs. It gives a formal de¯nition
for UOHs (with respect to polynomial time generated initial strings), and
constructs UOHs from one-way one-to-one functions (also called one-way
2injections). Naor and Yung use universal hash functions [CW79] [WC81] in
an essential way. All later constructions of UOHs [ZMI90b] [ZMI90c] [DY90]
[Rom90], except that of [ZMI90a], heavily depend upon this idea.
Another nice result of [NY89] is that it presents a method for transforming
any UOH into a digital signature scheme that is secure against existential
forgery under adaptive chosen message attack.
2.4 Reference [ZMI90a]
This paper presents a method for constructing UOHs from any one-way per-
mutations, whose (simutaneously) hard bits have been identi¯ed. The con-
struction has two interesting features. One is that it does not apply universal
hash functions, and hence is extremely compact, in comparison with most of
the currently known constructions. And the other is that ideas behind the
construction can be used to design practical one-way hash functions.
The paper also presents a method for constructing CIHs under the as-
sumption of the existence of distinction-intractable permutations. However
the assumption is stronger than that of claw free pairs of permutations.
2.5 References [ZMI90b] [ZMI90c]
De¯nitions for various versions of UOHs and CIHs are given, including as
a special case the de¯nition given in [NY89]. It is proved that UOHs with
respect to initial-strings chosen uniformly at random can be transformed into
UOHs with respect to initial-strings chosen arbitrarily. As an application of
the transformation result, it is shown that UOHs with respect to initial-
strings chosen arbitrarily can be constructed under a weaker assumption,
the existence of one-way quasi-injections.
Also the two papers initiate the investigation of relationships among the
various versions of one-way hash functions, and prove that some versions are
strictly included in others by explicitly constructing hash functions that are
one-way in the sense of the former but not in the sense of the latter.
32.6 Reference [DY90]
It constructs UOHs from one-way functions having the property that given
an element in the range of the function, it is computationally feasible to give
a good estimate of the size of the pre-image of the element. Note that one-way
quasi-injections [ZMI90b] and one-way regular functions [DY90] are special
cases of such kinds of one-way functions.
Several de¯nitions, which are seemingly di®erent but actually equivalent,
for CIHs are also given.
2.7 Reference [Rom90]
It ¯nally solves the ¯rst problem mentioned in Introduction, i.e., constructing
UOHs under the sole assumption of the existence of one-way functions. This
result simutaneously solves a long standing open problem | constructing
digital signature schemes that are secure against existential forgery under
adaptive chosen message attack, under the aforementioned assumption.
3 An Open Problem
Compared with UOHs, little progress on the construction of CIHs has been
made since the publication of [Dam87]. In fact, the ¯rst construction for
CIHs given in [Dam87], which assumes the existence of claw free pairs of
permutations, is currently also the best construction in the literature. So it
is natural to pose the following problem:
Construct CIHs under the assumption of
the existence of one-way functions.
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74 Appendix
4.1 Preliminaries
The set of all positive integers is denoted by N. Let § = f0;1g be the
alphabet we consider. For n 2 N, denote by §n the set of all strings over
§ with length n, by §¤ that of all ¯nite length strings including the empty
string, denoted by ¸, over §, and by §+ the set §¤¡f¸g. The concatenation
of two strings x;y is denoted by x¦y, or simply by xy if no confusion arises.
When x;y 2 §n, the bit-wise mod2 addition, also called the exclusive-or
(XOR), of x and y is denoted by x © y. The length of a string x is denoted
by jxj, and the number of elements in a set S is denoted by ]S.
Let ` be a monotone increasing function from N to N, and f a (total)
function from D to R, where D =
S
n Dn;Dn µ §n, and R =
S
n Rn;Rn µ
§`(n). D is called the domain, and R the range of f. In this paper it is
assumed, unless otherwise speci¯ed, that Dn = §n and Rn = §`(n). Denote
by fn the restriction of f on §n. We are concerned only with the case
when the range of fn is §`(n), i.e., fn is a function from §n to §`(n). f is an
injection if each fn is a one-to-one function, and is a permutation if each fn is
a one-to-one and onto function. f is (deterministic/probabilistic) polynomial
time computable if there is a (deterministic/probabilistic) polynomial time
algorithm (Turing machine) computing f(x) for all x 2 D. The composition
of two functions f and g is de¯ned as f ± g(x) = f(g(x)). In particular, the
i-fold composition of f is denoted by f(i).
A (probability) ensemble E with length `(n) is a family of probability
distributions fEnjEn : §`(n) ! [0;1];n 2 Ng. The uniform ensemble U with
length `(n) is the family of uniform probability distributions Un, where each
Un is de¯ned as Un(x) = 1=2`(n) for all x 2 §`(n). By x 2E §`(n) we mean
that x is randomly chosen from §`(n) according to En, and in particular, by
x2RS we mean that x is chosen from the set S uniformly at random. E is
samplable if there is a (probabilistic) algorithm M that on input n outputs
an x 2E §`(n), and polynomially samplable if furthermore, the running time
of M is polynomially bounded.
84.2 One-Way Functions
Let ` be a polynomial. A statistical test is a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm T that, on input a string x, outputs a bit 0/1. Let E1 and E2
be ensembles both with length `(n). E1 and E2 are called indistinguishable
from each other if for each statistical test T, for each polynomial Q, for all
su±ciently large n, jPrfT(x1) = 1g ¡ PrfT(x2) = 1gj < 1=Q(n), where
x1 2E1 §`(n);x2 2E2 §`(n). A polynomially samplable ensemble E is pseudo-
random if it is indistinguishable from the uniform ensemble U with the same
length.
Now we further assume that ` is a polynomial with `(n) > n. A string
generator extending n-bit input into `(n)-bit output strings is a deterministic
polynomial time computable function g : D ! R where D =
S
n §n and
R =
S
n §`(n). g will be denoted also by g = fgn j n 2 Ng. Let gn(U) be the
probability distribution de¯ned by the random variable gn(x) where x2R§n,
and let g(U) = fgn(U) j n 2 Ng. Clearly, g(U) is polynomially samplable.
The following de¯nition can be found in [Yao82] (see also [BM84], [GGM86]
and [ILL89]).
De¯nition 1 g = fgn j n 2 Ng is a (cryptographically secure) pseudo-
random string generator (PSG) if g(U) is pseudo-random.
One-way function is the basis of most of modern cryptographic functions
and protocols [IL89]. The following de¯nition is from [ILL89].
De¯nition 2 Let f : D ! R, where D =
S
n §n and R =
S
n §`(n), be a
polynomial time computable function, and let E be an ensemble with length
n. We say that
1. f is one-way with respect to E if for each probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm M, for each polynomial Q and for all su±ciently large n,
Prffn(x) = fn(M(fn(x)))g < 1=Q(n); when x 2E Dn.
2. f is one-way if it is one-way with respect to the uniform ensemble U
with length n.
9We note that a function f is one-way (with respect to the uniform en-
semble U with length n) i® f is one-way with respect to all pseudo-random
ensembles with the same length.
Next we introduce the concept of (simultaneously) hard bits.
De¯nition 3 Assume that f : D ! R is a one-way function, where D =
S
n §n and R =
S
n §`(n). Also assume that i1;i2;:::;it are functions from
N to N, with 1 · ij(n) · n for each 1 · j · t. Denote by E1
n and E2
n the
probability distributions de¯ned by the random variables xit(n) ¢¢¢xi2(n)xi1(n)¦
f(x) and rt ¢¢¢r2r1 ¦f(x) respectively, where x2R§n, xij(n) is the ij(n)-th bit
of x and rj2R§. Let E1 = fE1
n j n 2 Ng and E2 = fE2
n j n 2 Ng. We say
that
1. i1(n) is a hard bit of f if for each probabilistic polynomial time al-
gorithm M, for each polynomial Q and for all su±ciently large n,
PrfM(fn(x)) = x0
i1(n)g < 1=2 + 1=Q(n); where x2R§n and x0
i1(n) is
the i1(n)-th bit of an x0 2 §n satisfying f(x) = f(x0).
2. i1(n);i2(n);:::;it(n) are simultaneously hard bits of f if E1 and E2
are indistinguishable from each other.
4.3 One-Way Hash Functions
There are basically two kinds of one-way hash functions: universal one-way
hash functions and collision-intractable hash functions (or shortly UOHs and
CIHs, respectively). In [Mer89] the former is called weakly and the latter
strongly, one-way hash functions respectively. Naor and Yung gave a formal
de¯nition for UOH [NY89], and Damgº ard gave for CIH [Dam89].
Let ` and m be polynomials with `(n) > m(n), H be a family of functions
de¯ned by H =
S
n Hn where Hn is a (possibly multi-)set of functions from
§`(n) to §m(n). Call H a hash function compressing `(n)-bit input into m(n)-
bit output strings. For two strings x;y 2 §`(n) with x 6= y, we say that x
and y collide under h 2 Hn, or (x;y) is a collision pair for h, if h(x) = h(y).
H is polynomial time computable if there is a polynomial (in n) time
algorithm computing all h 2 H, and accessible if there is a probabilistic
10polynomial time algorithm that on input n 2 N outputs uniformly at ran-
dom a description of h 2 Hn. All hash functions considered here are both
polynomial time computable and accessible.
4.3.1 Universal Hash Functions
Universal hash functions, ¯rst introduced in [CW79], play essential roles
in many recent key results in cryptography [H90] [ILL89] [Rom90] and in
theoretical computer science.
De¯nition 4 Let k be a ¯xed positive integer, and H a hash function com-
pressing `(n)-bit input into m(n)-bit output strings. H is a (strong) universalk
hash function if for all n, for all k (distinct) strings x1;x2;:::;xk 2 §`(n)
and all k strings y1;y2;:::;yk 2 §m(n), there are ]Hn=2km(n) functions in Hn
that map x1 to y1, x2 to y2, :::, xk to yk.
De¯nition 5 Let H be a (strong) universalk hash function compressing `(n)-
bit input into m(n)-bit output strings. H has the collision accessibility prop-
erty if for all n, for all 1 · j · k and all j strings y1;y2;:::;yj 2 §m(n),
it is possible in probabilistic polynomial time to uniformly sample from H0
n,
where H0
n is the collection of all functions in Hn that map x1 to y1, x2 to y2,
:::, xj to yj, for some x1;x2;:::;xj 2 §`(n).
4.3.2 UOHs
Let H be a hash function compressing `(n)-bit input into n-bit output strings,
and E an ensemble with length `(n). The de¯nition for UOH is best described
as a three-party game. (See also Fig.1.) The three parties are S (an initial-
string supplier), G (a hash function instance generator) and F (a collision-
string ¯nder). S is an oracle whose power is un-limited, and both G and F
are probabilistic polynomial time algorithms. The ¯rst move is taken by S,
who outputs an initial-string x 2E §`(n) and sends it to both G and F. The
second move is taken by G, who chooses, independently of x, an h2RHn and
sends it to F. The third and also ¯nal (null) move is taken by F, who on
input x 2 §`(n) and h 2 Hn outputs either \?" (I don't know) or a string
11y 2 §`(n) such that x 6= y and h(x) = h(y). F wins a game i® his/her output
is not equal to \?". Informally, H is a universal one-way hash function with
respect to E if for any collision-string ¯nder F, the probability that F wins
a game is negligible. More precisely:
De¯nition 6 Let H be a hash function compressing `(n)-bit input into n-
bit output strings, P a collection of ensembles with length `(n), and F a
collision-string ¯nder. H is a universal one-way hash function with respect
to P, denoted by UOH/P, if for each E 2 P, for each F, for each polynomial
Q, and for all su±ciently large n, PrfF(x;h) 6=?g < 1=Q(n), where x and
h are independently chosen from §`(n) and Hn according to En and to the
uniform distribution over Hn respectively, and the probability PrfF(x;h) 6=?g
is computed over §`(n), Hn and the sample space of all ¯nite strings of coin
°ips that F could have tossed.
4.3.3 CIHs
The following de¯nition for CIH corresponds to collision free function family
given in [Dam87]. Let A, a collision-pair ¯nder, be a probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm that on input h 2 Hn outputs either \?" or a pair of strings
x;y 2 §`(n) with x 6= y and h(x) = h(y).
De¯nition 7 H is called a collision-intractable hash function (CIH) if for
each A, for each polynomial Q, and for all su±ciently large n, PrfA(h) 6=
?g < 1=Q(n); where h2RHn, and the probability PrfA(h) 6=?g is computed
over Hn and the sample space of all ¯nite strings of coin °ips that A could
have tossed.
The de¯nition for CIH can also be considered as a two-party game as is
shown in Fig.2.
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A 3-Party Game
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A 2-Party Game
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